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HOW PRECIPITOUS A DECLINE?: 
U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND THE 
TRANSITION FROM AMERICAN 
PRIMACY 
Hillary Mann Leverett* 
The present essay is grounded in two basic propositions.  The 
first is that the greatest strategic challenge facing the United States is 
extricating its foreign policy from a well-worn but deeply 
counterproductive quest for hegemonic dominance in critical areas of 
the world, especially the Middle East. The second is that 
Washington’s handling of its relations with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran constitutes a crucial test of America’s capacity to put its foreign 
policy on a more productive and realistic trajectory. 
On the first proposition, it has been just a little more than 
two decades since the United States came out of the Cold War with a 
multi-faceted supremacy in global affairs like the world had not 
witnessed for centuries, if not millennia. If one compares where 
America was just twenty years ago to where it is today, in terms of its 
ability to achieve its international objectives, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the United States is a declining power. It is declining, 
in part, because of the emergence of new power centers in key 
regions around the world—China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and even the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran itself.1 It is declining because of an 
economic “triple whammy” of accumulated debt, eroding 
infrastructure, and lagging economic growth.2 In much of the world, 
it is also declining because of the perceived culpability in the United 
States for the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.3 More recently, the 
                                                 
1 For representative discussion from an already vast and burgeoning 
literature, see, for example, MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: 
THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 
(2d ed. 2012); ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND AMERICA 
BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT 
(2009); CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, NO ONE’S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, 
AND THE COMING GLOBAL TURN (2012); KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE NEW ASIAN 
HEMISPHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE SHIFT OF GLOBAL POWER TO THE EAST (2008); 
Flynt Leverett & Pierre Noël, The New Axis of Oil, NAT’L INT., Summer 2006; 
Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, & Steven Weber, Report and Retort: A World Without 
the West, NAT’L INT., July-Aug. 2007; Christopher Layne, The Waning of U.S. 
Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay, 34 INT’L SEC. 147, 152-57 (2009); NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 
(2008), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025
_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf; and NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL 
TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS 16-20 (2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/115962650/Global-Trends-2030-Alternative-Worlds. 
2 The “triple whammy” metaphor is adapted from Stephen Walt, The End 
of the American Era, NAT’L INT., Nov.-Dec. 2011.  See also Flynt Leverett, Black Is the 
New Green, NAT’L INT., Jan-Feb. 2008; DAVID P. CALLEO, FOLLIES OF POWER: 
AMERICA’S UNIPOLAR FANTASY 94-125 (2009); STEPHEN S. COHEN & J. 
BRADFORD DELONG, THE END OF INFLUENCE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN OTHER 
COUNTRIES HAVE THE MONEY (2010); MICHAEL MORAN, THE RECKONING: 
DEBT, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER (2012).   
3 On the “soft power” costs to the United States of the global financial 
crisis (from various perspectives), see, for example, the following: Dennis Blair, 
Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, Testimony to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., Feb. 12, 2009, 2-3, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf; Christopher Layne, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power, in SOFT POWER AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 65-66 
(Inderjeet Parmar & Michael Cox, eds., 2010); Susan Aaronson, Financial Crisis 
Hurts U.S. Soft Power, POL’Y INNOVATIONS (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000090; Peter Beinart, 
How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power, TIME, June 21, 2010, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1995884,00.html; and 
U.S.’s soft power is under challenge, XINHUA, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/20/content_10224257.htm.  
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United States’ continuing inability to address its fiscal challenges, 
either in the short- or long-term, prompted China’s Xinhua news 
agency to editorialize about the need to start “building a de-
americanized world.4 
But on top of these factors, American standing and influence 
in world affairs is declining because of the failure of American 
political and policy elites, especially since the end of the Cold War, to 
define clear, reality-based goals and to relate the diplomatic, 
economic, and military means at Washington’s disposal to realizing 
them soberly and efficaciously.5 In the wake of the Cold War, 
American policymakers in Democratic and Republican 
administrations have ignored a key lesson that foreign policy realism, 
balance of power theory, and an even minimally sensitive reading of 
international history all teach: while global dominance and hegemony 
seem nice in theory, in the real world they are unattainable; not even 
a state as powerful as the United States coming out of the Cold War 
can achieve them. Moreover, pursuing hegemony actually ends up 
making a state weaker, by dissipating resources and sparking 
resistance from others.6 
In the post-Cold War period, the counterproductive 
consequences of America’s hegemonic strategy have been especially 
acute in the Middle East. As Flynt Leverett and I note in our book, 
Going to Tehran, the temptations of empire have lured great powers 
before the United States into what the historian Paul Kennedy 
                                                 
4 U.S. fiscal failure warrants a de-Americanized world, XINHUA, Oct. 13, 2013,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-10/13/c_132794246.htm]   
5 This is the animating theme of Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, 
The Balance of Power, Public Goods, and the Lost Art of Grand Strategy: American Policy 
toward the Persian Gulf and Rising Asia in the 21st Century, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 202 (2012).   
6 See also ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (2008); CALLEO, supra note 2, at 1-38; STEPHEN M. 
WALT, TAMING AMERICAN POWER: THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO U.S. PRIMACY 1-
178 (2005); John Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith 
eds., 2006); John Mearsheimer, Imperial By Design, NAT’L INT., Jan.-Feb. 2011.   
 
2013 Mann Leverett 2:2 
331 
famously called “imperial overstretch.”7 But America’s post-Cold 
War imperial turn in the Middle East has arguably set a new record 
for the largest amount of influence and wealth squandered by a great 
power in the shortest period of time.8 
An ill-considered posture toward the Islamic Republic has 
contributed mightily to Washington’s current strategic predicament in 
the Middle East. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, America’s Iran 
policy has emphasized three main elements, all grounded in hostility: 
first, diplomatic isolation; second, economic pressure, largely through 
sanctions; and third, barely veiled support for regime change in 
Tehran. This approach has manifestly failed, even on its own terms.9 
Today, as Flynt Leverett notes in his contribution to this symposium, 
the United States is a power in relative decline in the region.  In 
contrast, the Islamic Republic, is a rising power.10 As we will see, 
continued U.S. hostility toward Iran only courts further and even 
more precipitous decline in America’s standing and influence in this 
vital part of the world. 
America’s dysfunctional Iran policy also threatens the long-
term sustainability of U.S. influence—or, as American policymakers 
prefer to say, “leadership”—on the global level. Three issues illustrate 
this dynamic. First, Washington regularly claims that it is the Islamic 
Republic which endangers the free flow of hydrocarbons from the 
Persian Gulf to international markets. Today, however,  it is 
America’s efforts to compel Tehran to surrender its developments of 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities by imposing more and more 
sanctions on the Islamic Republic and through the continuing threat 
of U.S.-initiated (or Israeli-initiated and U.S.-supported) military 
action against it—not Iranian behavior—that are the leading threats 
                                                 
7 PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987).   
8 FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING TO TEHRAN: 
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN 4 (2013).   
9 Id. at 279-82.   
10 Flynt Leverett, The Iranian Nuclear Issue, the End of the American Century, 
and the Future of International Order, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 240 (2013).   
 
2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
332 
to the security of Persian Gulf hydrocarbon flows.11  For China and 
other rising powers dependent on the free flow of Persian Gulf 
energy supplies to international markets, this raises real questions 
about America’s claim to provide the global public good of 
international energy security by ensuring the physical security of 
those supplies.12 
Second, the expansion of Iran-related secondary sanctions to 
cover not only investment in Iranian hydrocarbon production but 
also simple purchases of Iranian crude oil and most non-energy-
related transactions with Iran is incentivizing China and other rising 
powers to develop alternatives to established, U.S.-dominated 
mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international 
transactions.13 This, too, has potentially profound, negative 
implications for America’s international economic leadership. 
Third, as Flynt Leverett notes in his contribution to this 
volume, the larger part of the international community—120 of the 
U.N.’s 193 member states that are part of the Non-Aligned 
Movement—are already on record in support of Iran’s right to 
pursue safeguarded enrichment.14 The ongoing efforts of American 
administrations unilaterally to rewrite the NPT where Iran is 
                                                 
11 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Iran Policy and the 
Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-Aug. 2013, at 38, 
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.   
12 Discussions with Chinese academics, analysts, and officials, Beijing, 
China, June 2011, June 2012, and July 2013. See also JOHN GARVER, FLYNT 
LEVERETT, & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, MOVING (SLIGHTLY) CLOSER TO IRAN: 
CHINA’S SHIFTING CALCULUS FOR MANAGING ITS “PERSIAN GULF DILEMMA” 3-
17 (2009), http://legacy2.sais-
jhu.edu/centers/reischauer/moving_slightly_closer.pdf. 
13 Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 5 at 229-30. See also Leverett & 
Mann Leverett, supra note 11, at 40-42; Neelam Deo & Akshay Mathur, Guest post: 
BRICS ‘Hostage’ to west over Iran sanctions, need financial institutions, FIN. TIMES BLOG 
(June 27, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/06/27/guest-
post-brics-hostage-to-west-over-iran-sanctions-need-their-own-financial-
institutions/#axzz2ZsLPgSNs.   
14 Jason Ditz, Non-Aligned Movement Unanimously Backs Iran’s Civilian 
Nuclear Program, ANTIWAR.COM (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://news.antiwar.com/2012/08/31/non-aligned-movement-unanimously-
backs-irans-civilian-nuclear-program/; Leverett, supra note 10.   
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concerned is extremely troubling to Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and 
other rising powers in the Global South, further undermining the 
perceived legitimacy of American international “leadership” and 
feeding a growing unwillingness in much of the world to tolerate 
such hegemonic assertions by the United States. 
On the second of my two basic propositions, Flynt Leverett 
and I lay out in Going to Tehran what is at stake for the United States 
in its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Just as Washington’s 
dysfunctional approach toward the Islamic Republic is a crucial 
element in America’s strategic decline, in the Middle East and 
globally, America’s capacity to recast its policy toward Iran will be 
critical to its strategic recovery. In the Middle East, the United 
States—for its own interests and on classic balance-of-power 
grounds—needs to pursue strategic rapprochement with the Islamic 
Republic. On a global level, too, putting America on a more positive 
and productive strategic trajectory requires a thoroughgoing revision 
of its Iran policy. 
But, as the U.S.-Iranian competition for influence over the 
Middle East’s regional order intensifies, Washington’s approach to 
Tehran has grown ever less receptive to serious, strategically-
grounded engagement and ever more oriented toward coercive 
options, including the militarized prevention of Iranian nuclearization 
and the assertive rollback of Iranian influence. These options raise 
the risk of another U.S.-initiated war in this vital region. Moreover, 
by pursuing them, the United States condemns itself to a future as an 
increasingly flailing, and failing, superpower—and as an obstacle to, 
rather than a facilitator of, a rules-based international order.15 
I. THE PERILS OF DEMONIZATION 
Washington’s antipathy toward the Islamic Republic is 
grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American 
strategic culture. They include: difficulty accepting independent 
power centers; hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate 
their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat 
                                                 
15 Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 11, at 42.   
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and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-
backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are 
meant to constrain others, not the United States itself.16 
These features of American strategic culture are both 
conditioned and reinforced by the hegemonic thrust of American 
foreign policy. In the Middle East, America’s imperial turn has 
prompted it to demonize would-be challengers to its primacy there. 
One of the more significant manifestations of this practice has been 
Washington’s persistent refusal to understand and accept the basic 
model underlying Iran’s postrevolutionary order—the integration of 
participatory politics and elections with principles and institutions of 
Islamic governance and a strong commitment to foreign policy 
independence. 
This refusal has real consequences for America’s Iran debate. 
Instead of recognizing the dysfunctionality of their country’s Iran 
policy and correcting course, American political, policy, and media 
elites have preferred, and continue to prefer, looking to “regime 
change”—whether “hard” or “soft”—in Tehran to solve America’s 
Iran problem. To justify such a posture, these elites go on depicting 
the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate system so despised by its own 
population as to be in imminent danger of overthrow. American 
elites have been doing this for more than thirty years, virtually since 
the Islamic Republic’s founding out of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
And for more than thirty years, the Islamic Republic has consistently 
defied their relentless predictions of its collapse or defeat.17 
The Islamic Republic has survived because its basic model 
(participatory Islamic governance and foreign policy independence) 
is—according to polls, electoral participation rates, and other 
indicators—what a majority of Iranians living inside their country 
want. They do not want a political order grounded in Western-style 
secular liberalism. They want an indigenously-generated political 
order reflecting their cultural and religious values—as the reformist 
                                                 
16 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Consequences of western 
intransigence in nuclear diplomacy with Iran, AL JAZEERA, May 10, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/2013589151459212.html.   
17 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 142-46.   
 
2013 Mann Leverett 2:2 
335 
President Mohammad Khatami wrote, “freedom, independence, and 
progress within the context of both religiosity and national 
identity.”18 
This was the vision of Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founding father. It is embodied in 
the Islamic Republic’s constitution; it is what the Islamic Republic, 
with all its flaws, offers Iranians the chance to pursue, on their own 
terms.  Even most of those Iranians who want the Islamic Republic 
to evolve in significant ways still want it to be, at the end of the day, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.19 Impressive developmental outcomes 
since the revolution reinforce Iranians’ sense of the Islamic Republic 
as a genuinely national project that is theirs to build and own. Under 
the Islamic Republic, Iran has diversified its economy to a greater 
extent than any other major oil-exporting country in the Middle East. 
This means, among other things, that Iran today is less dependent on 
oil revenues to cover both its government budget and its imports 
than Saudi Arabia or any of the smaller Gulf Arab monarchies on the 
other side of the Persian Gulf.20 Contrary to deeply rooted but ill-
informed Western stereotypes, the Islamic Republic has achieved far 
more progressive outcomes in alleviating poverty, delivering health 
care, providing educational access, and (yes) expanding opportunities 
for women than the Shah’s regime ever did.21 
Notwithstanding the Islamic Republic’s staying power, 
foreign policy pundits who, in many cases, have no direct connection 
to on-the-ground reality inside Iran continue telling us that the 
system is on the verge of collapse. This message is reiterated by 
America’s so-called Iran “experts,” many of whom are Iranian 
expatriates or Iranian-Americans whose families fled the Revolution 
                                                 
18 The quote is from “Letter for Tomorrow,” an open letter published by 
Khatami in May 2004.  
19 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 177-87. 
20 See, for example, the data presented in Mehran Kamrava, The Political 
Economy of Rentierism in the Persian Gulf, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
PERSIAN GULF 39, 42-47 (Mehran Kamrava, ed., 2012), showing that Iran now 
covers 50-60 percent of its imports with non-oil exports. 
21 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 187-94.   
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and want to see the Islamic Republic overthrown, perhaps even 
violently overthrown.22 
A good example of this came in 2009, when, in a collective 
act of analysis-by-wishful-thinking, American elites widely anticipated 
a victory by former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi over 
incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in that year’s Iranian 
presidential election.23 Many Western analysts and commentators saw 
a Mousavi victory as the key to solving America’s strategic problems 
in the Middle East. Some—including senior Obama administration 
officials—even posited what they called an “Obama effect,” through 
which the United States would be able to effect “soft” regime change 
in Iran, achieved much more effectively than through the heavy-
handed and overly militarized approach applied by neoconservatives 
in Iraq.24 
When, in June 2009, Ahmadinejad won re-election in the 
Islamic Republic’s presidential contest, American analysts and elites 
almost universally condemned the outcome as a fraud.25 They did so 
even though every methodologically sound poll conducted in Iran 
before and after the election—including polls conducted by Western 
polling groups (14 polls in all)—showed that Ahmadinejad’s re-
election with roughly two-thirds of the vote (which is what the 
official results show that he got) was eminently plausible.26 And 
                                                 
22 See id. at 285-326, for a discussion of this point.   
23 Id. at 228-31, 232-38. 
24 See, e.g., Athena Jones, Obama Administration Has Eye on Iran, MSNBC, 
June 12, 2009; Howard LaFranchi, Wildcard in Iran Election: Obama, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 11, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2009/0611/p06s28-usfp.html; Paul Brandeis Raushenbush, The Obama Effect 
in Iran and Lebanon - Role Model Instead of Straw Man, HUFFINGTON POST, June 8, 
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-raushenbush/the-obama-effect-in-
iran_b_212399.html; Michael Slackman, Hopeful Signs for U.S. in Lebanon Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/middleeast/09lebanon.html?_r=0; 
Simon Tisdall, Lebanon Feels the Obama Effect, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/08/lebanon-elections-
obama-effect.  
25 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 231-32.   
26 Id. at 238-43.  On Iranian public opinion in connection with the 
Islamic Republic’s 2009 presidential election, see also Ben Katcher, LIVE 
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American elites embraced a narrative of election fraud even though 
neither Mousavi nor anyone else ever presented any evidence of how 
the election was stolen.27 This never-demonstrated but fervently-
espoused narrative also conditioned American and Western elites’ 
romanticization of the Green Movement, widely portrayed in the 
West as a mass popular uprising poised to sweep away the Islamic 
Republic, perhaps within just a few months. But it was evident to 
anyone prepared to look soberly at reality that, even at its height, the 
Green Movement did not represent anything close to a majority of 
Iranians and that, within a week of the June 2009 election, the 
movement’s social base was already contracting.28 
                                                 
STREAM: What Does the Iranian Public Really Think?, RACE FOR IRAN (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.raceforiran.com/live-stream-what-does-the-iranian-public-really-think; 
Steven Kull et al., An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public: The June 12 Election, 
The Perceived Legitimacy of the Regime, and the Nature of the Opposition, 
WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pd; 
Steven Kull et al., An Analysis of Multiple Polls Finds Little Evidence Iranian Public Finds 
Government Illegitimate, WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/652.php?lb=b
rme&pnt=652&nid=&id=; SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI, EBRAHIM MOHSENI, 
AND MAHMOUD SALAHI, MARDOM VA ENTEKHĀBĀT DAHOM [PEOPLE AND THE 
TENTH ELECTIONS] (2012).   
27 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 245-56.  On the 
election, see also Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Op-Ed., Ahmadinejad won. 
Get over it, POLITICO (June 15, 2009),  
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23745.html; Flynt Leverett, Hillary 
Mann Leverett, & Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Will Iran be President Obama’s Iraq?, 
POLITICO (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/24099.html; Eric Brill, Did Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad Steal the 2009 Iran Election?, RACE FOR IRAN (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.raceforiran.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/IranArticle-
060110/pdf; Reza Esfandiari and Yousef Bozorgmehr, A Rejoinder to the Chatham 
House Report on Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election Offering a New Analysis of the Results, in 
Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Persistent (and Game-Changing) Myths: Iran’s 
2009 Presidential Election, One Year Later, RACE FOR IRAN (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.raceforiran.com/persistent-and-game-changing-myths-
iran%E2%80%99s-2009-presidential-election-one-year-later. 
28 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 259-72.  On the Green 
movement, see also Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Op-Ed., Another 
Iranian Revolution?  Not Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 5. 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/opinion/06leverett.html?_r=1&.   
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And yet the myth of the Islamic Republic’s illegitimacy and 
instability did not die as a result of the Green movement’s failure. 
Indeed, it got a new lease on life in early 2011, when the Arab 
Awakening began. Through the pro-Green lens that continues to 
shape most Western commentary on Iranian politics, it seemed 
inevitable that the waves of popular discontent breaking across the 
Arab world would soon engulf the Iranian government. Most of the 
pundits who had jumped on the regime-change bandwagon in 2009 
hopped back on for another ride. 
On February 20, 2011, billionaire financier George Soros, 
appearing on CNN’s GPS with Fareed Zakaria, offered a bet that 
“the Iranian regime will not be there in a year’s time.”29  Two days 
later, in Foreign Policy, Flynt Leverett and I took Soros up on his 
wager.30 We even bet that not only would the Islamic Republic still be 
Iran’s government in a year’s time but that the balance of influence 
and power in the Middle East would be tilted even further in its 
favor. More than two years have elapsed since Soros made his wager; 
we are eager to collect on it. 
Today the myth of the Islamic Republic’s illegitimacy and 
fragility comes in two interlocking versions: one, that sanctions are 
now finally “working” to undermine the Islamic Republic’s basic 
stability; and two, that the Arab Awakening has left the Islamic 
Republic isolated in its own neighborhood. 
On sanctions, Flynt Leverett and I made our most recent visit 
to Iran in October 2013. No one who has walked the streets of 
Tehran recently, as we did, seen that Iran’s economy is not 
collapsing, and talked with a range of Iranians living in Iran could 
possibly think that sanctions are “working” in a way that will compel 
either the Islamic Republic’s implosion or its surrender to American 
demands on the nuclear issue. There is no constituency—among 
conservatives, reformists, or even what is left of the Green 
                                                 
29 Fareed Zakaria GPS, Interview with George Soros, CNN (Feb. 20, 2011), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1102/20/fzgps.01.html. 
30 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Obama Is Helping Iran, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 23, 2011),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/23/obama_is_helping_iran.   
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Movement—prepared to accept such an outcome. Those arguing to 
the contrary have never explained why Iran’s economy is so much 
worse that it was in the 1980s, when the Islamic Republic lost half its 
GDP while defending itself in its eight-year war with Iraq—and yet, 
even then, its population did not rise up to force fundamental change 
or concessions to hostile powers. 
Indeed, there is no precedent anywhere for a sanctioned 
population mobilizing to overthrow its government and replace it 
with one that would adopt the policies preferred by the sanctioning 
foreign power.31 In the Iranian case, moreover, the Islamic Republic 
has over years demonstrated its capacity to adapt dynamically to 
sanctions, in ways that do not just stave off collapse but, in some 
instances, actually benefit its economy.32 
                                                 
31 Even in Iraq, where severe sanctions were imposed for over a decade, 
killing more than one million Iraqis (half of them children), the population did not 
rise up to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  In the end, Saddam was displaced only by a 
U.S. invasion—and, even after that, Iraqis did not set up a pro-American, secular, 
liberal government ready to subordinate Iraq’s sovereignty and national rights to 
Washington’s preferences.  For critical discussion of Western commentators’ 
exaggerated claims about sanctions’ impact on popular attitudes and official 
decision-making in the Islamic Republic, see Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann 
Leverett, Time to Face the Truth About Iran, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2013, 
http://www.agenceglobal.com/index.php?show=article&Tid=2965, MIDDLE EAST 
ONLINE, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=56911; Sune Engel 
Rasmussen, Tight Times in the Grand Bazaar, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/16/sanctions_iran_daily_life; 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Understanding the Rial’s Freefall, LOBE LOG FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.lobelog.com/understanding-the-rials-freefall/; and 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Is Iranian Hyperinflation a Mirage?, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 23, 
201), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/hyperinflation-iran-
manti-teo.html.   
32 See, e.g., LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 281 
(discussing how sanctions can encourage greater self-sufficiency in Iran, citing how, 
in response to the 2010 enactment of U.S. secondary sanctions targeting gasoline 
exports to Iran, the Islamic Republic accelerated the expansion of its refining 
capacity to a point that, in 2011, it became a net exporter of gasoline, with 
Afghanistan as one of its biggest customers); Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 
30 (discussing how the realignment of the rial’s nominal value with its real value has 
boosted Iran’s non-oil exports); William Yong & Alireza Hajihosseini, Understanding 
Iran Under Sanctions, OXFORD ENERGY COMMENT FROM THE OXFORD INSTITUTE 
FOR ENERGY STUDIES (Jan. 2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
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Recently, some commentators have claimed that Hassan 
Rohani’s victory in the Islamic Republic’s 2013 presidential election 
proves U.S.-instigated sanctions are finally “working” by fueling 
popular discontent with nuclear policies that have prompted 
escalating international pressure. Such discontent supposedly drove 
Iranians to elect a candidate inclined to cut concessionary deals with 
the West. This “analysis,” badly misreads Rohani’s views on the 
nuclear issue.33 Furthermore, a close examination of the 2013 
presidential election—including, once again, analyses of high-quality 
polling data from methodologically-sound surveys—demonstrates 
that, in fact, it was not sanctions but a functioning political system 
that worked to produce Rohani’s election.34 
On the Arab Awakening, the same pundits who say that 
sanctions are working advise Americans and others to embrace the 
logic-defying proposition that the same political and social currents 
that deposed pro-American leaders in Tunisia and Egypt and are 
empowering Islamists in countries across the Arab world will, in Iran, 
somehow transform the Islamic Republic into a secular liberal state. 
This is truly analysis-by-wishful-thinking. In Tehran, policymakers 
and analysts see the Arab Awakening as hugely positive for the 
Islamic Republic’s regional position. They judge—correctly, in my 
view— that any Arab government which becomes more 
representative of its people’s beliefs, concerns, and preferences will, 
virtually by definition, become less enthusiastic about strategic 
                                                 
content/uploads/2013/01/Understanding-Iran-Under-Sanctions-Oil-and-the-
National-Budget.pdf.   
33 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, How Washington Should 
Engage Iran’s New President, HUFFINGTON POST, June 17, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/iran-new-
president_b_3456007.html; Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, What Rouhani’s 
Election Should Mean For Washington, THE HINDU, June 18, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/what-rouhanis-election-should-mean-
for-washington/article4823926.ece. 
34 Flynt Leverett, Hillary Mann Leverett, & Seyed Mohammad Marandi, 
Op-Ed., Rouhani won the Iranian election.  Get over it, AL JAZEERA, June 16, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201361681527394374.html.   
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cooperation with the United States, let alone Israel, and more open to 
the Islamic Republic’s message of foreign policy independence.35 
More particularly, over the last two and a half years 
Washington commentators have regularly intoned that, because of 
the Arab Awakening, Tehran is going to “lose Syria,” its “only Arab 
ally,” with “dire consequences” for Iran’s regional position and 
internal stability. These observations underscore how deeply 
American elites are in denial about basic political and strategic trends 
in the Middle East. They highlight how slow American elites have 
been to grasp that, today, the Islamic Republic’s most important Arab 
ally is not Syria, but post-Saddam Iraq the first Arab-led Shi’a state in 
history, an outcome made possible by the U.S. invasion and 
occupation. Besides this, Tehran’s assessment that Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad will not be overthrown—at least not by Syrians—has 
proven, against Washington pundits’ confidently dismissive critiques, 
correct.36 
Looking ahead, any plausibly representative government in 
Syria will not be more pro-American or pro-Israel than the Assads 
have been. That is why Tehran has strongly endorsed negotiations 
between the Assad government and oppositionists aimed at a 
political settlement; it is oppositionists and their external backers 
(including the United States) that refuse to deal with Assad. The 
Islamic Republic strenuously resists the Assad government’s 
replacement by a Taliban-like political structure. But it is external 
support for opposition forces, in which foreign jihadis play an 
increasingly prominent role, that generates this risk—a risk that, 
perversely, also threatens the security interests of the United States, 
which has foolishly called for Assad’s removal.  Iranian decision-
makers—and their allies in Lebanese Hizballah—judge that they are 
on the right side of history in resisting efforts to use Syrian 
                                                 
35 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 97. 
36 On this point, see also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 30.   
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oppositionists to shift the regional balance so as to prop up 
America’s declining strategic position.37 
II. THE IMPERATIVE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
What all of this constant “getting Iran wrong” reflects is a 
delusion that the United States is still basically in control of the 
strategic situation in the Middle East. In this delusion, sanctions are 
inflicting ever-rising hardship on Iran’s economy. Either Tehran will 
surrender to U.S. demands that it stop enriching uranium, or the 
Iranian public will rise up and transform the Islamic Republic into a 
pro-Western liberal state. And if neither of those things happens, 
then at some point, the American military will destroy Iranian nuclear 
installations. 
This is a truly dangerous delusion, grounded in persistent 
American illusions about Middle Eastern reality. If, under current 
conditions in the region, the United States launches another war to 
disarm yet another Middle Eastern country of weapons of mass 
destruction it does not have—even as Washington stays quiet about 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal—the blowback against American interests will 
be disastrous. It will make the extraordinary damage done to 
America’s strategic position by the Iraq War look almost trivial by 
comparison.38 But this is where our current strategy—negotiating on 
terms that could not possibly interest Iranian leaders while escalating 
covert operations, cyber-attacks, and economic warfare against the 
Islamic Republic—leads. 
A preventive attack against Iranian nuclear facilities by the 
United States would be, as Flynt Leverett and Mary Ellen O’Connell 
argue in their contributions to this symposium, utterly devoid of 
                                                 
37 For further discussion, see Hal intahat julat Qusayr wa tudā’yāthā [Has the 
Qusayr round ended and what are its implications?] (Interview with Flynt Leverett), 
MIN AD-DAKHIL (Al-Mayadeen), July 7, 2013,  
http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/Programs/Episode/dmqS2FYuUkeiDqH3AP3_4
w/2013-07-07-تهت-هل ة-ان ير-جول ص ق ها-و-ال يات داع    .ت
38 On this point, see also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 30.   
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international legitimacy.39 There will be no United Nations Security 
Council resolution authorizing such action; growing Russian and 
Chinese disaffection with the thrust of American Middle East policy 
and distrust of America’s long-term intentions in the region preclude 
this.40  The Non-Aligned Movement is already on record that it 
would consider an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities illegal; the United 
States would have no allies for the purpose, save Israel and—
perhaps—the United Kingdom.41 
The use of force against the Islamic Republic to destroy non-
existent nuclear weapons would ratify America’s image, in the Middle 
East and beyond, as an outlaw superpower. This prospect is even 
more dangerous to America’s strategic position today than it was 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Just a few years ago, the United States was effectively still an 
unchallenged superpower. The views of publics—or even many 
elites—in most other countries did not matter much to American 
decision-makers; especially in the Middle East, Washington could 
usually impose its requirements on compliant governments whose 
foreign policies were largely unreflective of their own peoples’ 
opinions.  Today, as more Middle Eastern publics seek both a larger 
voice in political processes and greater independence for their 
nations, their views on regional and international issues matter much 
more. The utter rejection, internationally and in the United States, of 
President Obama’s publicly announced intention to attack Syrian 
government targets earlier this year raises a serious question 
whether—after strategically failed military interventions in 
                                                 
39 Leverett, supra note 10; Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla, 
The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 
PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 315.   
40 Multiple discussions with Russian and Chinese officials and analysts 
since 2006 confirm this point. 
41 Britain’s attorney general formally advised Her Majesty’s Government 
in 2012 that a preventive attack on Iran would violate international law; on this 
basis, London has reportedly declined to support U.S. contingency planning for 
military strikes against the Islamic Republic.  See Nick Hopkins, Britain rejects US 
request to use UK Bases in nuclear standoff with Iran, GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/25/uk-reject-us-request-bases-iran.   
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Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—America can still even credibly 
threaten the effective use of force in the Middle East.42 
In this context, Washington needs better relations with 
Tehran to save what is left of the U.S. position in the Middle East. At 
this point in the evolution of the Middle Eastern balance of power, 
the United States cannot achieve any of its high-priority goals in the 
region absent a realignment of relations with Tehran. Iran is a critical 
player for shaping the future not only of Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
Syria as well. America needs Iranian help to contain the rising tide of 
jihadi terrorism and, more generally, Sunni-instigated sectarian 
agitation and violence in the region—phenomena fueled by Saudi 
Arabia and Washington’s other ostensible Arab allies in the Persian 
Gulf. More broadly, U.S. foreign policy must adapt itself to and 
accommodate the rising demand for participatory Islamist 
governance in the Middle East. Coming to terms with the Islamic 
Republic is an essential step in such a process. 
On a global level, too, rapprochement with Iran is vital to 
America’s long-term strategic recovery.  U.S.-Iranian realignment is 
necessary to ensure the future adequacy and security of hydrocarbon 
flows from the Persian Gulf to international energy markets—
something that will continue to be a high-order economic and foreign 
policy interest for the United States, regardless of how far the shale 
revolution ends up pushing it toward a (strategically artificial) 
                                                 
42 This was an important theme in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
New York Times Op-Ed in September 2013, in which he wrote, “It is alarming that 
military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become 
commonplace for the United States.  Is it in America’s long-term interest?  I doubt 
it.  Millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of 
democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under 
the slogan ‘you’re either with us or against us.’  But force has proved ineffective 
and pointless.  Afghanistan is reeling, and no one can say what will happen after 
international forces withdraw.  Libya is divided into tribes and clans. In Iraq the 
civil war continues, with dozens killed each day.  In the United States, many draw 
an analogy between Iraq and Syria, and ask why their government would want to 
repeat recent mistakes.” Vladimir Putin, A Plea for Caution from Russia: What Putin 
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standard of “energy independence.”43 Furthermore, there are huge 
prospective costs that will accrue to America’s interests and strategic 
standing, globally as well as in the Middle East, from continued U.S. 
hostility toward Iran.44 
More than ever before, American interests require 
rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Flynt Leverett and I argue 
that, for its own interests, the United States must therefore take a 
fundamentally different approach in its Iran policy—an approach 
captured in the title of our book (Going to Tehran) and in its subtitle 
(Com[ing] to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran). America needs to 
come to terms with the Islamic Republic—not as a favor to Iran, but 
to save its own strategic position and avert the catastrophe of another 
U.S.-initiated Middle Eastern war, with all that would flow from such 
a conflict. Coming to terms with the Islamic Republic means 
accepting it as a legitimate political order representing legitimate 
national interests—and as a rising regional power unwilling to 
subordinate its foreign policy to Washington. No American president 
since the Iranian Revolution—not even Barack Hussein Obama—has 
been prepared to do this.  But it is a key argument in our book that 
this is not just the only basis on which diplomacy with Iran can 
succeed—it is the only way for the United States to forestall strategic 
implosion.45 
III.  THE CHINA MODEL 
There is an important precedent in recent American history 
for this kind of strategically-grounded, genuinely transformational 
diplomacy. Accepting a rising regional power as a legitimate entity 
pursuing its interests in a fundamentally rational and defensive way is 
                                                 
43 On this point, see also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 5, at 210-
11. 
44 Leverett, supra note 10.  
45 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 1-11.   
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how President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger enabled the 
historic opening to China in the early 1970s.46 
Nixon and Kissinger’s achievement was not to “talk” to 
Beijing; Washington had been doing that for years in ambassadorial-
level discussions in Geneva and Warsaw. As Kissinger himself has 
noted, the United States and the People’s Republic held one hundred 
and thirty-six iterations of these talks, over sixteen years, before the 
Nixon-Kissinger opening. They were narrow in scope, focused 
overwhelmingly on grievance, and, as Kissinger describes it, served 
only to institutionalize stalemate.47 Nixon and Kissinger’s 
achievement was not to talk to Beijing. Rather, it was to accept—and 
to persuade Americans to accept—the People’s Republic as, in 
Nixon’s words, “[a nation] pursuing [its] own interests as it 
perceive[s] these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we 
see them.”48 
Nixon came to office with a deep understanding that the 
United States needed to realign relations with the People’s Republic.  
For twenty years, from the time of the Chinese Revolution, the 
United States had worked to isolate and undermine the People’s 
Republic of China.  Washington did not just pursue a “regime 
change” policy toward the People’s Republic; it recognized a whole 
other political structure based on Taiwan as the “real” government of 
China.49  The results of these policies were terrible for the United 
States and its strategic standing.  Trying not to “contain” but to 
suppress and undermine China ended up undermining the U.S. 
position in Asia, and got America into the draining quagmire of 
Vietnam. 
                                                 
46 Id. at 369-87 (providing a comprehensive discussion that draws lessons 
from the experience of Sino-American rapprochement for U.S. diplomacy with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran).   
47 HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 722 (1994); HENRY KISSINGER, ON 
CHINA 221-24 (2011). 
48 Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy of 
Peace, First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 
1970s 119 (Feb. 18, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835. 
49 For rich and insightful discussion, see especially JAMES PECK, 
WASHINGTON’S CHINA: THE NATIONAL SECURITY WORLD, THE COLD WAR, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALISM (2006). 
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In this challenging context, Nixon saw that rapprochement 
with the People’s Republic was a strategic imperative for the United 
States.  Suggestions that Nixon’s outreach to Beijing was motivated 
primarily by an interest in “triangulating” with China against the 
Soviet Union define his vision—and, ultimately, his achievement—
too narrowly.50  On a tactical level, extricating America from Vietnam 
figured far more prominently in Nixon’s diplomatic calculations vis-à-
vis China.51 On a strategic level, Nixon apprehended that realigning 
Sino-American relations would, as Kissinger later put it, allow 
Washington “to regain the diplomatic initiative while the war in 
Vietnam was still in progress.”52 
To be sure, realigning relations with the People’s Republic 
meant that the United States would have to give up its failed quest 
for hegemony in Asia.  This quest, though, had already proven 
grossly counterproductive for American interests, in Asia and 
globally, while the strategic benefits of an opening to China would, in 
Nixon’s judgment, be enormous.  At a time when the People’s 
Republic was a rising regional power, but far removed in many 
respects from the status of global economic powerhouse it holds 
today, Nixon understood that, as Kissinger later wrote, “excluding a 
country of the magnitude of China from America’s diplomatic option 
meant that America was operating internationally with one hand tied 
behind its back.”53 In the end, their initiative to realign relations with 
China saved America’s position in Asia after the tragedy-cum-strategic 
stupidity of Vietnam and restored Washington’s global leadership. 
Nixon did not just grasp the need for U.S. rapprochement 
with China; he also recognized that achieving it would require two 
fundamental changes in Washington’s posture toward Beijing. First, 
                                                 
50 KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra note 47, at 213-15; HENRY KISSINGER, 
WHITE HOUSE YEARS 189-90 (1979); MARGARET MACMILLAN, NIXON AND MAO: 
THE WEEK THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 56-57, 122-23, 162 (2007).   
51 Discussions with Chas Freeman (the veteran U.S. diplomat who 
worked on China policy intensively during the early years of his career and served 
as Nixon’s interpreter on his historic 1972 trip to Beijing; KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, 
supra note 47, at 707; KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra note 47, at 214; MACMILLAN, 
supra note 50, at 4-5.   
52 KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 47, at 713.   
53 Id. at 720-21.   
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he realized that it was incumbent on the United States, as the 
stronger party with a record of stubborn hostility toward the People’s 
Republic, to demonstrate its bona fides proactively to Chinese leaders. 
So, upon taking office, Nixon directed the CIA to stand down from 
its longstanding covert operations programs in Tibet and ordered the 
U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet to stop what Beijing considered aggressive 
patrolling in the Taiwan Strait.54 Nixon did these things so that the 
Chinese leadership would know his diplomatic outreach  was serious. 
Second, Nixon astutely assessed that the incremental, step-by-
step diplomacy being intermittently pursued in ambassadorial 
channels would never achieve a real breakthrough. On the basis of 
this assessment, he took what Kissinger called the “extraordinary” 
decision “to put aside all the issues which constituted the existing 
Sino-American dialogue,” (where “each side stressed its grievances,”) 
and to instead concentrate “on the broader issue of China’s attitude 
toward dialogue with the United States.”55 When Nixon did this, 
Chinese leaders knew they had a serious partner, prepared to accept 
the People’s Republic, and responded accordingly. Two and a half 
years later, this approach bore rich fruit with the announcement of 
the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972.56 
                                                 
54 TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 349-50 
(2007); Charles Freeman, The Process of Rapprochement: Achievements and Problems, in 
SINO-AMERICAN NORMALIZATION AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (Gene T. 
Hsiao & Michael Witunski, eds. 1983).  Additionally, Nixon directed his 
administration to relax restrictions on travel to and small-scale commercial 
exchanges with the People’s Republic and, when Soviet and Chinese military units 
clashed along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, communicated to Moscow that the 
United States would not quietly acquiesce to a major strategic defeat of the People’s 
Republic. See also U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, supra note 48, at 140-42; 
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 47, at 723-24; KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra 
note 47, at 210-20.  
55 KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 47, at 722. 
56 Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of 
China (Feb. 27, 1972) IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969-
1976, Vol. 17, CHINA, 1969-1976, doc. 203, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203. 
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IV. GOING TO TEHRAN 
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei and the four Iranian 
presidents elected over the course of Khamenei’s 24-year tenure as 
the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader have all said repeatedly that 
Tehran is open to better relations with America—but only on the 
basis of mutual respect, equality, and American acceptance of Iran’s 
post-revolutionary political order. These terms are strikingly similar 
to those that China’s communist leaders specified for Sino-American 
rapprochement. The core argument of Going to Tehran is that, today, 
America must engage Iran on precisely this basis and realign its 
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as thoroughly as Nixon 
and Kissinger realigned U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of 
China in the early 1970s.57 
What would it mean, in practical terms, for Washington to 
accept the Islamic Republic and realign relations with it in this way, 
particularly with reference to the nuclear issue?  On the nuclear issue, 
it would mean accepting Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment of 
uranium.  Insisting on “zero enrichment”—or even open-ended 
“suspension—only ensures that negotiations will fail. American 
recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights is a key to diplomatic success. In 
return for such recognition, the Islamic Republic would ratify and 
implement the Additional Protocol to the NPT and agree to other 
more intrusive verification and notification requirements. These steps 
would give the IAEA as robust a level of access to Iranian nuclear 
facilities, similar to the access it enjoys to comparable facilities 
anywhere in the world. Once the terms of the deal were finalized, the 
United Nations Security Council would lift the multilateral sanctions 
it has imposed on Iran over its nuclear activities, and Washington 
would roll back its Iran-related unilateral and secondary sanctions.58 
Additionally, America and its international partners should 
lock in a deal on the nuclear issue through expanded nuclear 
cooperation with the Islamic Republic.  Very senior Iranian officials 
                                                 
57 For further discussion of Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s 
as a model for a comprehensive realignment of U.S.-Iranian relations, see 
LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 387-92.  
58 Id. at 392.  
 
2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
350 
have said repeatedly, including in conversations with Flynt Leverett 
and me, that countries concerned about aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
program should send scientists and technicians to work 
collaboratively on those activities with Iranian counterparts. Tehran 
has said for years that Iran would be open to associating its nuclear 
program with multilateral nuclear consortia (including for the 
production of nuclear fuel) and other joint venture arrangements. 
The United States and its partners should take up these expressions 
of openness to international nuclear cooperation.59 
Accepting Iran’s right to enrich is important not only as the 
key to a diplomatic solution on the nuclear issue.  t also implies 
acknowledgement of the Islamic Republic as a legitimate and 
enduring political order representing legitimate national interests. 
Thus, resolving the nuclear issue can and should be used as the basis 
for a more comprehensive realignment of relations between 
Washington and Tehran. As part of a broader process of U.S.-Iranian 
rapprochement, the United States should invite the Islamic Republic 
into regional negotiations about post-conflict stabilization in 
Afghanistan and about a prospective political settlement in Syria. 
America’s strategic recovery in the Middle East will necessarily 
include a reinvention of the “Middle East peace process;” in this 
vein, Washington should also engage Tehran on the daunting array of 
issues gathered under the heading “the Arab-Israeli conflict.”60 
Achieving this sort of comprehensive, “Nixon-to-China” 
rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran is the biggest 
strategic challenge facing the United States today. 
 
                                                 
59 Id. at 392-93.   
60 For more detailed discussion, see id. at 393-95.  
